As the Russian invasion of Ukraine progressed, a far-right Ukrainian military regiment slowly made global headlines again.
Russian President Vladimir Putin cited the presence of such units within the Ukrainian army as one of the reasons for launching his so-called special military operation, in order to demilitarize and “denazify” Ukraine.
On May 5, 2014, in Berdyansk, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine established the Azov Special Purpose Police Patrol Battalion. It was formed mainly from members of the Automaidan and Patriot of Ukraine civic organizations, with Andriy Biletsky as its commander.
On June 30, soldiers of the Azov battalion detained Igor Guskov, a pro-Russian Cossack centurion from Berdyansk and an accomplice of one of the then leaders of the terrorists in Donbas, Russian Igor Girkin. During interrogation, he confessed that he was supposed to bring a group of sappers to Berdyansk to prepare terrorist attacks. The sappers had previously blown up a bridge in Orikhiv and were planning to blow up a hospital, a military registration office, and several other facilities.
On September 17 (Berdyansk City Day), by order of Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov, the battalion was expanded to a regiment, and on November 11 of the same year, it was incorporated into the National Guard of Ukraine, with subsequent replenishment to the combat standard of the National Guard brigades.
The unit also took part in the battles on the Svitlodarsk arc and for Ilovaisk, and liberated Mariupol.
On February 10, 2015, Azov liberated five villages east of Mariupol from occupation: Shyrokyne, Berdianske, Lebedynske, Kominternove, and Pavlopil.
In August 2016, on the initiative of the commander of the National Guard of Ukraine, part of the Azov Special Forces was withdrawn to guard checkpoints in Zaporizhzhia, and from the autumn of that year, the unit carried out anti-amphibious defense tasks on the coast of the Azov Sea.
Currently, Azov is a separate special forces unit of the National Guard of Ukraine, military unit 3057, stationed in Mariupol.
From the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion until May 20, 2022, the Azov Special Forces defended Mariupol as part of the local garrison.
According to visual estimates, during the 86 days of defending the city, 82 of which were spent in complete encirclement, the regiment's fighters eliminated 3,500 enemy personnel and wounded another 5,000.
In April 2022, Azov soldiers fought defensive battles in the Zaporizhzhia direction near the village of Velyka Novosilka in the Volnovakha district of Donetsk region.
In February 2023, Azov became the 12th Special Forces Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine, and in May, this unit was deployed in the Orikhiv direction during the start of the counteroffensive.
Currently, more than 1,000 Azov soldiers are being held captive by Russia. Among those who have been captured is the current commander of the brigade, Colonel Denis Prokopenko, nicknamed “Redis.”
Are all members of the regiment neo-Nazis?
Of course not. There are no units in the National Guard, just as there are none in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, that are formed on ideological grounds.
The only possible ideology of a National Guard unit is its disciplinary code. Which, incidentally, stipulates the duty to “respect the rights, honor, and dignity of the human person” and “refrain from statements and actions that violate human rights or undermine the honor and dignity of the human person.”Responding not only from a formal point of view, I can add that among the founders and fighters of Azov, from the very beginning, there were people with a neo-Nazi background and far-right views. However, not all of the battalion's founders had such a background. Among the first Azov fighters, for example, there was a group of Automaidan activists, including several ethnic Jews (and at least one Israeli citizen). Most of the far-right fighters left the regiment by the end of 2014. The remaining right-wing radicals who openly articulated their views were deliberately “purged” by the regiment’s new command in 2017. In recent years, there has been no basis whatsoever for accusations that neo-Nazis are serving in the Azov regiment.
Is this a paramilitary or official structure?
Azov is a separate special forces unit of the Ukrainian National Guard (military unit 3057), an official state unit under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Moreover, unlike some volunteer units created in 2014, Azov has never been an unofficial unit: from the outset, it has been part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Who serves in Azov?
Those who wish to defend their homeland and its people and have passed a competitive selection process (there are many volunteers, so Azov can afford to be selective).
Ukrainians of various ethnic origins (including Russians, Jews, Crimean Tatars, etc.) and religious and political views have served and continue to serve in Azov. There are no restrictions in this regard. According to the unit's leaders, most of the personnel are Russian-speaking.
Is the leader of the far-right National Corps party the head of Azov?
Of course not. Active military personnel in Ukraine are prohibited from joining political parties because defending the homeland is above politics and party interests.
The head of the National Corps political party, Andriy Biletsky, who did indeed participate in the creation of the unit and is widely considered its founder, led Azov for only a few months in the summer and early fall of 2014, after which he returned to political activity. Of course, he maintained (and maintains) certain ties with his “brainchild,” raised funds for the treatment and rehabilitation of wounded fighters, and actively involved his former comrades in his own political projects or commercial structures (primarily private security companies), but since October 2014, he has had no formal relationship with the unit.
Are the “National Militia” part of the Azov regiment?
No. The National Militia is a public organization. Incidentally, it has not been active for almost two years. It had no direct connection to the National Guard regiment.
However, the National Militia was headed by Igor Mikhailenko, who was Andriy Biletsky's successor as regiment commander.
Is the Azov Regiment the combat wing of the National Corps?
Of course not. The political party has no direct connection to the regiment. The regiment exists separately from the party, not only formally but also in essence. The Armed Forces of Ukraine and the National Guard are apolitical.
However, the creation of Azov is what Andriy Biletsky is most proud of. It was his participation in the ATO, the liberation of Mariupol, and the regiment's successful PR that made Biletsky famous and popular, secured his election to parliament, and ensured his presence in the media. Therefore, Biletsky tries to exploit the Azov “trademark” in political life. His first political project after returning to public life in October 2014 was even called the Azov Civil Corps. Biletsky is happy to recruit veterans of the regiment to the National Corps party, and he refers to the collection of public organizations surrounding the party as the “Azov movement.” Certain informal ties continue to be maintained. However, this is more about public legitimization and the conversion of certain social capital earned in the ATO into political capital. Other public figures who became known to the general public precisely as founders of volunteer formations did the same, such as the first commander of the Donbas battalion, Semen Semenchenko.
Are there ultra-rightists from Europe/the US serving there?
No. Foreigners cannot serve in the National Guard (unlike the Armed Forces of Ukraine).
It should be noted that in the beginning, in 2014, when not all formalities were strictly observed, there were indeed foreigners in Azov (in early summer 2014, there were three times more fighters in the unit than on the roster, which was common practice at the time). Azov was interested in people with experience in Western armies. Foreigners were attracted to Azov by the unit's far-right image. Personal connections were also important in 2014. Among the founders of Azov, an influential group of activists with an ultra-right background was particularly important, and they were looked up to by like-minded people abroad. However, a lot has changed in eight years. There have been no foreigners, especially from Western countries, in Azov for several years now. In recent years, adventurous Western far-right activists have tried several times to join the regiment. At best, they got to enjoy cheap, high-quality Ukrainian beer for a while before returning home; at worst, the most persistent and radical were deported by the Security Service of Ukraine.
Is the organization considered extremist?
It is considered so in the Russian Federation, where, as is well known, Facebook and Instagram are considered extremist resources.
However, it should be noted that several years ago, there was a discussion in the United States about recognizing Azov as a foreign terrorist organization.
At that time, against the backdrop of growing far-right terror in the country, Congressmen decided for the first time to symbolically add to the list of such organizations a foreign group of “white supremacists,” as the far right is called in the United States (previously, this list included only Islamists, some national separatist movements, and left-wing radicals). However, the initiators, guided by the image created by the media, did not even understand that this was a state agency, not an informal paramilitary group. After clarification, this initiative was forgotten, and the first group of “white supremacists” to be added to the terrorist list was the Russian Imperial Movement.
Are members of the organization participants in war crimes?
As is well known, only a court can determine whether a person is a criminal. However, when it comes to war crimes committed during an armed conflict, the situation is more complicated. Vladimir Putin and Sergei Shoigu have been unequivocally recognized as war criminals.
If we rephrase the question as “Are there credible grounds to suspect that Azov fighters may have committed war crimes?”, the answer is yes. There are grounds to believe that in 2014, some fighters violated the laws and customs of war with regard to civilians. However, such cases were not systematic, and the individuals who allegedly committed crimes left the unit by 2015 at the latest. In addition, it should be added that there are grounds to assert that sporadic violations of the laws and customs of war in 2014 took place in almost every unit. Moreover, according to available information, there were fewer such violations in “ideological” formations such as Azov or the Right Sector Ukrainian Volunteer Corps than in “regular” units (for example, the notorious Tornado battalion). It seems that the biggest violator of human rights in the ATO zone on the side of the contact line controlled by the Ukrainian government was the SBU. However, the scale of violations cannot be compared to the bloody lawlessness of pro-Russian armed formations in the temporarily occupied territory.
Does Azov advocate for the “purity of the white race”?
No, never. Not even the National Corps political party advocates this. Yes, Andriy Biletsky personally made racist statements in 2006–2010. However, even in informal communication, no such statements have been recorded from him since at least the beginning of 2014.
Does Azov hold torchlight processions?
I have never asked myself this question, just as I have never asked whether Azov plays ping-pong. I am not sure that this is really worth paying attention to. It in no way characterizes either the activities or the nature of the ideology. In Oslo, a torchlight procession commemorated the victims of the terrorist attack by white supremacist Anders Breivik. In Moscow, torchlight processions mark the victory over Nazism. Torchlight processions are practiced by the Red Cross Society in Italy and the military in Germany, and were practiced by Soviet communists and pioneers, after all.
Does Azov glorify Nazi ideology?
“We despise Nazism and Stalinism,” states one of the latest posts on the unit's official Telegram channel (dated March 28). Incidentally, it is written in Russian.
Are Azov fighters committing war crimes in Mariupol? (both in relation to 2014 and separately since February 24)
As mentioned above, isolated cases are possible. However, such incidents were not (and are not) systematic in nature. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission, which was present in Mariupol until the end of February 2022 (and continues to work in Donetsk), did not record any such cases. Even the Russian side has not provided any convincing evidence of such crimes.
However, any hypothetical violations by Azov, which is defending civilians from the aggressor, cannot even theoretically be compared to airstrikes on a maternity hospital or a drama theater where women and children were hiding. Against the backdrop of a city with a pre-war population of 400,000 that has been wiped off the face of the earth, no Russian accusations against the defenders of Mariupol deserve even a mention.
Why does the Western audience continue to express concern about Azov?
There are three answers to this question.
First, the ultra-right and, in some cases, neo-Nazi background of some of Azov's founders is true.
This was partly reflected in Azov's emblem. However, it was not reflected in Azov's activities in any way. For example, there was a fairly large Jewish community in Mariupol, with a functioning synagogue, which in eight years never had any problems with any Azov fighters. The situation is similar with Muslims in the city and the large (about 100,000) Greek community. The greatest danger to the ethnic communities of Mariupol, as well as to all residents of the city, was the indiscriminate use of heavy weapons against civilian infrastructure by Russian aggressors. However, the fact that Azov founder Andriy Biletsky continued to exploit the regiment's name for years while creating new nationalist political projects further confused outside observers.
I hope that this detailed analysis of the issues surrounding Azov will help to clarify the situation.
But there are two more factors.
Second, Russian propaganda is involved in creating the image of a criminal neo-Nazi “national battalion.” It does not shy away from outright lies, but by using certain objective facts (such as the regiment's emblem and the political past of its founders), it has managed to create a striking image. This image is virtual, but Russian propaganda should not be underestimated. It is systematic, professional, and surprisingly convincing, especially in Western society, which is not accustomed to such blatant lies. Western society tends to reject a black-and-white view of the world and consider more complex models. It is characteristic of Western society to seek the truth somewhere between polar points of view. But the truth, as Adam Michnik said, does not lie in the middle, it lies where it lies.
And finally, the most unpleasant thing. Any propaganda only works when people are willing to believe it. People find convincing what they already agree with internally. It is convenient for the West to lull itself with tales that everything is complicated and ambiguous, because then it can refrain from interfering without being reproached by its sensitive conscience.
One of the factors contributing to the persistence of the myth of Ukrainian fascism is precisely that it is not only beneficial to Russia. It is a perfect excuse to do nothing while watching Ukraine fight alone against a superior enemy, without feeling much sympathy for the soldiers of the Azov Regiment who are dying in an unequal battle, defending Mariupol with their last ounce of strength. And that is why, and not just because it is untrue, the myth of Ukrainian fascism must die as soon as possible.
Vyacheslav Likhachov, historian, political analyst, head of the National Minority Rights Monitoring Group, specially for EuroMaidan SOS.